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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILY LAW IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JUNE 2004-JUNE 2005
Matthew I. Fraidin*
I.

PATERNITY

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals" or "Court")
issued opinions relating to paternity in the cases of Matthews v. Districtof Columbia and Simms v. United States. In Matthews v. District of Columbia,1 the Court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's paternity action. 2 The Court
of Appeals held that the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" does not preclude the
Police and Firefighters' Retirement and Relief Board from declining to adjudicate the paternity of an applicant for survivors' benefits. The Court also held that
"primary jurisdiction" does not preclude this Board from requiring that the applicant obtain a declaration of paternity from the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. 3 In Matthews, the mother of a child applied to the Board for survivors'
benefits payable pursuant to District of Columbia Code ("D.C. Code") section 5716 to surviving children of firefighters killed in the line of duty.4 The Board held
a hearing and denied appellant's application for benefits because the Board was
"unable to determine that [the child] was the child of the deceased firefighter." 5
The Board directed the claimant to seek an adjudication of paternity from the
Superior Court.6 The mother filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the
child was the child of the deceased firefighter. 7 The trial judge dismissed the
Complaint, holding that the question of the child's paternity was reserved to the
Board in accordance with the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction."8
The Court of Appeals described the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: "issues in
claims that are originally cognizable in the courts may, nonetheless, be referred to
an administrative body for resolution when the issue falls within the 'special competence' of an agency." 9 The Court recognized that the Board "has been desig*
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1 875 A.2d 650 (D.C. 2005).
2 Id. at 650; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-716 (Supp. 2005) (listing provisions for survivor benefits for police and firefighters).
3 Matthews, 875 A.2d at 650.
4 Matthews, 875 A.2d at 652; D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-716 (Supp. 2005).
5 Matthews, 875 A.2d at 653.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 653-54.
9 Id. at 655 (quoting Lawlor v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 964, 973 n.ll (D.C. 2000)).
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nated by the Mayor as the entity to consider all applications for firefighter
benefits," and that "the Board is vested with the power
to make findings of fact
10
and conclusions of law in furtherance" of its mission.
The Court held, however, that determination of paternity is a matter that is
distinct from, although related to, the areas of the Board's expertise, and more
appropriately a judicial function.11 Indeed, the court "regularly" adjudicates paternity and is a "centralized, competent authority" on the subject.' 2 In light of the
Board's own "estimation of its competence," the many varied applications of paternity determinations, such as "financial interests [and] medical interests," and
the importance of such determinations, the Court remanded the case to the trial
court to resolve the issue of paternity.13
In Simms v. United States,14 the Court of Appeals upheld appellant's conviction of a charge of simple assault, committed against his fianc6e's fourteen-month
old child. 15 Appellant claimed that the trial judge improperly failed to instruct
the jury about the defense of "reasonable parental discipline," arguing that, although not the child's biological father, appellant was in loco parentis to the
child.

16

Simms was convicted of simple assault in connection with injuries suffered by
17
his fiancde's son, who was in Simms' care at the time the injuries were incurred.
Simms testified at trial that several of the injuries resulted from playing, and
others were attendant to "disciplinary methods" Simms had employed with the
child, such as slapping the child for knocking down a vase and failing to go to
18
sleep.
Simms contended that, although he is not biologically-related to the child,
their relationship was substantial enough to constitute an in loco parentis relationship. 19 Thus, Simms requested that the trial court instruct the jury that he was
entitled to use "reasonable parental discipline" with the child. The trial court
declined to offer the instruction, and Simms was convicted. 0
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, affirming the trial court's finding
that appellant's relationship did not satisfy the standard for an in loco parentis
relationship, and that appellant thus was not entitled to the instruction he
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 657-58 (quoting In re D.M., 562 A.2d 618, 621 (D.C. 1989)).
867 A.2d 200 (D.C. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 201.
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sought. 2 1 The Court reaffirmed its own longstanding precedent that a person may
be found to be in loco parentis to a child only if the adult has both assumed and
22
discharged the "obligations attendant to the parental relation.,
In this situation, Simms had never resided with or provided a home for the
child, and had only cared for the child on "four or five" occasions during the nine
months that had elapsed since he met the child's mother.2 3 The Court also noted
that the fact that Simms was caring for the child at the time of the incident underlying the criminal charges was "fortuitous," and resulted from Simms' temporary
inability, due to an injury, to go to work, and did not reflect that Simms was
responsible on a long-term basis for the child's care or welfare. 24 The court found
that, notwithstanding Simms' expressed intention to have a closer relationship
with the child, he had not assumed or discharged the duties of a parent.25
II.

COMMON-LAW

MARRIAGE

In Mesa v. United States,26 Joseph Mesa, the defendant who was charged and
convicted of murdering two fellow students at Gallaudet University, challenged
the trial court's determination that he had not established the existence of a common law marriage and thus could not invoke the marital privilege. 2 7 Mesa contended that his relationship with Melani de Guzman satisfied the requisite
elements of a common law marriage and that he was thus entitled to preclude the
government from calling her as a witness.28
In the District of Columbia, "the elements of a common law marriage.., are
cohabitation as husband and wife, following an express mutual agreement, which
must be in words of the present tense.",29 The trial court found that although
Mesa and de Guzman intended to be married in the future, their relationship did
not constitute a common law marriage. The trial court thus did not permit Mesa
to invoke the marital privilege. 3 °
The Court of Appeals observed that the existence of a common law marriage
is largely a factual determination. "Thus, we will affirm the trial court's findings
21 Id. at 206-07.
22 Id. (citing Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 770 (D.C. 1968)).
23 Id. at 206.
24 Id. at 206-07.
25 Id.
26 875 A.2d 79 (D.C. 2005).
27 Id. Pursuant to D.C. Code section 14-306, spouses may decline to testify against each other,
without regard to subject matter or the manner in which the putative witness came into possession of
the information, and a spouse is deemed "not competent" to testify as to confidential communications
that occurred between the spouses. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (2001).
28 Mesa v. United States, 875 A.2d 79, 83 (D.C. 2005).
29 Id. at 83 (quoting Coates v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 1993)) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
30 Id.
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... unless appellant can persuade us that it is plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it."' 31 The Court of Appeals succinctly recited the evidence adduced at
trial, some of which supported and much of which conflicted with a claim that a
common law marriage existed.32 In light of the presence of a substantial amount
of evidence supporting the trial court's finding, and the trial court's express finding that de Guzman's testimony on the subject lacked credibility, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. In doing so, the Court of Appeals
found that "Mr. Mesa was not entitled to invoke the marital privilege with respect to Ms. de Guzman's testimony, the letters he wrote to her, and his conver33
sations with her.",
III.

CMLD SUPPORT

In Slaughter v. Slaughter,3 4 the Court of Appeals held that so-called "make
whole" settlements obtained by a parent constitute income for purposes of computing the parent's child support obligation under the D.C. Child Support Guidelines.35 In calculating the child support obligations of the parties, the trial court
included in its calculation of Ms. Slaughter's income approximately two-thirds of
the proceeds ($127,000 of $185,000) she received in settlement of a lawsuit she
had threatened to bring against her employer.3 6 Ms. Slaughter contended that the
proceeds reflected an amount calculated to "make [her] whole" after she suffered
personal injury damages in connection with her employment. 37 Slaughter observed that courts in Virginia and New York have excluded from child support
calculations monies accrued by a parent to "make whole" that parent.3 8
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's inclusion of the sum, however,
pointing out that D.C. Code section 16-916.01 defines countable income very
broadly as "income from any source". The Court of Appeals also noted that the
provision includes among the non-exclusive list of sources of countable income
"insurance proceeds," described by the Court as "a form of income that often, if
39
not invariably, includes a 'make whole' element.,
31 Id. at 83-84 (quoting East v. East, 536 A.2d 1103, 1106 (D.C. 1988)) (citation and internal
quotation omitted).
32 Id. at 84.
33 Id.
34 867 A.2d 976 (D.C. 2005).
35 Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.01(c) (Supp. 2005) (listing principles for child support
guidelines).
36 Slaughter v. Slaughter, 867 A.2d 976 (D.C. 2005).
37
38
39

Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 977.
Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.01(c) (Supp. 2005)) (emphasis added).
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In Rogers v. Johnson,40 the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding of
criminal contempt for non-payment of child support. 4' Appellant argued that the
trial court improperly entered a judgment of conviction for nonpayment of child
support without evidence that defendant had an ability to pay child support.42 He
argued that because a finding of criminal contempt under D.C. Code section 46225.02(b)(1) must include a finding that the defendant "willfully failed to obey
any lawful order of child support," the government must prove that the defendant had the financial ability to pay in accordance with the underlying support
order.4 3

The Court of Appeals observed that the statute states that a presumption of
willfulness arises from the mere failure to pay - "[F]ailure to pay child support, as
ordered, shall constitute prima facie evidence of a willful violation."' 44 The statute
permits rebuttal of the presumption of willfulness with evidence of such circumstances as incarceration, hospitalization or disability of the defendant during the
period in which defendant failed to pay support. 45 The Court noted that defendant had not offered evidence to rebut the presumption of willfulness. 46 Defendant also had not claimed at trial that he was unable to pay in accordance with
the child support order.47 Presumably at least in part because of Defendant's
failure to create a trial record regarding inability to pay, the Court upheld the
conviction without expressing a view as to whether evidence of an inability to pay
child support would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of willfulness created,
under the statute, by failure to pay in accordance with the order.

IV.

NEGLECT

In In re T.L., 48 the Court of Appeals remanded for further fact-finding the
trial court's order barring visitation between a mother and her two children.49
The trial court had terminated the mother's visits with the children because the
children's permanency plan 5° had been established by prior order of the court as
adoption by the foster parents with whom the children were residing, and because the children's therapist recommended that visitation be terminated.
40

862 A.2d 934 (D.C. 2004).

41

Id.

42

Id. at 935.

43 Id. at 937 (referencing D.C.
44

45
46
47

CODE ANN.

§ 46-225.02(b)(1) (2001) (emphasis added)).

Rogers v. Johnson, 862 A.2d 934 (D.C. 2004); D.C.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-225.02(d) (2001).

CODE ANN.

§ 46-225.02(d) (2001).

Rogers, 862 A.2d at 937-38.
Id. at 937.

48 859 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 2004).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1088, 1090; see also D.C.
manency hearing shall include ...

CODE ANN.

§ 16-2323(c) (2001) ("[T]he purpose of the per-

determining the permanency plan for the child ....").
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The Court of Appeals observed that a "complete prohibition against any visitation with [children] is even more severe than a denial of custody." 51 The Court
carefully scrutinized the basis for the trial court's order because of the enormity
of the consequences of the order, namely that, in light of the pending adoption
proceedings, "the mother is likely never to see the children again. "52 The Court
also expressed concern that denial of visitation made the outcome of the adoption proceeding a foregone conclusion, because the mother's ongoing lack of contact would "impair" her ability to contest the adoption petition.5 3
The Court held that the choice of adoption as a permanency goal "does not
automatically warrant a ban on any visitation" while achievement of that goal
remains pending.54 The Court did not preclude prohibitions on visitation in cases
presenting "special circumstances," but noted that termination of visitation in
many cases will "unnecessarily impair or even shatter the existing family
relationship. 5

Turning to the therapist's report, the Court of Appeals expressed its discomfort with the "conclusory nature" and "skimpy analysis" of the therapist's report
on which the court based its order.56 Even though uncontroverted in the record
on appeal, the Court of Appeals was unwilling to allow the report to serve as the
sole basis for termination of visits because of the report's lack of explanation of
the basis for the conclusion, and the failure to address evidence of an earlier,
loving, and healthy relationship between the children and their mother.57
58
The Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional fact-finding.
The Court did not, however, order the reinstitution of visits and permitted, but
did not require, the trial court to hold a hearing. The Court noted that the trial
court had offered to the parties an opportunity to object to the report and to
request a fact-finding hearing, and that appellant had foregone the opportunity.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals expressly found in 2001, in In re Ko. W.,59 that
the trial court's order barring visits between a father and his child could not have
been based on a firm factual foundation because no evidentiary hearing was
held.6 ° In In re Ko.W., however, the father had never made an appearance in the
case and was not offered an opportunity, as was the mother in In re T.L., to
51
2001)).
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

In re T.L., 859 A.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C. 2004) (citing In re Ko.W., 774 A.2d 296, 304 (D.C.
Id. at 1091.
Id.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1093.
774 A.2d 296 (D.C. 2001).
In re Ko.W., 774 A.2d 296 (D.C. 2001).
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request a hearing. 6 1 Thus, although In re T.L. appears to reflect the Court's continued insistence that visitation termination orders be carefully considered and
thoroughly documented, this decision clarifies the Court's view of the nature and
type of procedural protections required in visitation termination situations.
In In re Kya. B.,62 the Court of Appeals upheld findings of neglect relating to
two of three siblings (Kya. B. and K.B.), and remanded for further findings the
trial court's determination that a third sibling, Kye. B., was neglected.63 In this
case, the Court addressed for the second time in a few months the meaning of
"imminent danger" in the D.C. neglect statute.' The Court also applied for the
first time in a family law context the broad reading of the hearsay exception for
"statements made for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment"65 set forth in
67
66
criminal cases such as Jones v. United States and Galindo v. United States.
Kya. B. was adjudicated neglected by the trial court pursuant to D.C. Code
section 16-2301(9)(A), 68 which, in pertinent part, defines as "neglected" a child
who "has been.., abused by his or her parent, guardian or other custodian ....
Under the then-existing statute, an "abused" child was one "whose parent...
inflicts physical or mental injury upon the child, including excessive corporal punishment ... ,,69
The school nurse testified at trial, without objection by appellant, that Kya. B.
had come to the nurse's office with a bleeding cut over her left eye. 70 Kya. B. told
the nurse that her mother had struck her with a broom handle because Kya. B.
had been unable to locate her school uniform. 71 The trial court found that, in
separate incidents, the mother had caused abrasions on Kya. B.'s arm and cuts
around Kya. B.'s neck because of the child's perceived disobedience during "hair
grooming sessions."' 72 On the basis of the nurse's testimony and testimony from
appellant, the trial court found that appellant had abused Kya. B. 73 The Court of
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 299; In
857 A.2d 465
Id.
Id. at 472-73;
In re Kya. B.,
813 A.2d 220
630 A.2d 202

re T.L., 859 A.2d 1087, 1089-90 (D.C. 2004).
(D.C. 2004).

68

D.C. CODE

ANN.

In re Te.L., 844 A.2d 333 (D.C. 2004).
857 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C. 2004).
(D.C. 2002).
(D.C. 1993).
§ 16-2301(9)(A)(2001)

(now

codified

at

D.C.

CODE

ANN.

§ 16-

2301(9)(A)(i) (Supp. 2005)).
69 In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 467-68 n.2 (D.C. 2004) (referencing D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(23)
(2001). The revised statute does not use the corporal punishment language. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 162301(23) (Supp. 2002).
70 In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 471.
71 Id. at 470.
72 Id. at 471.
73 Id. at 469-70. The Court of Appeals also quoted extensively from the neglect petition signed
under oath by a Metropolitan Police Department detective. The Court observed that the detective's
sworn statement is consistent with the testimony that the detective gave during the initial appearance
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Appeals affirmed the finding of neglect as to Kya. B., finding that the force used
74
by the mother reflected "a pattern of excessive corporal punishment.
The Court rejected appellant's argument that the trial court's findings were
based on inadmissible hearsay testimony by the nurse. 75 After noting that appellant had not objected at trial to admission of the testimony, the Court of Appeals
observed in dicta that under Galindo v. United States,7 6 a witness's hearsay testi-

mony regarding statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment may include an explanation of the cause of injuries. 77 Although
"attributions of fault" generally are inadmissible, statements made to a medical
care provider about the cause of injuries "may facilitate treatment" and thus are
admissible. 78 In addition, statements about the consequences - psychological and
emotional, as well as physical - of abuse are admissible under this exception,
because these statements
"are relevant to treatment in preventing a reoccurrence
79
of the abuse."

The trial court found that K.B. and Kye. B. were neglected because Kya. B.
had been abused and K.B. and Kye. B. were in imminent danger of being abused
"based on the abuse that this court has found that this mother has inflicted on her
child, [Kya. B.]."8'

in the case. Id. at 468 n.4; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308 (2001) (initial appearance in neglect
proceedings). The Court of Appeals left unaddressed the rationale underlying its reference to the
neglect petition - which is a sworn statement not subject to cross-examination - and the detective's
testimony, which occurred three months prior to the trial in the case. In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 468
n.4.
Similarly, the extent and nature of the Court's reliance on these sources of information in affirming the trial judge is somewhat unclear. The opinion does not indicate whether the detective's
initial appearance testimony was made a part of the trial record and does not indicate the extent to
which the Court of Appeals' evaluation of the testimony reflects the less-stringent evidentiary standards applicable during the initial appearance as compared to the trial. Testimony may be admitted
during the initial appearance "whether or not such evidence would be admissible at the fact finding
hearing ..

74
75
76
77
1993)).

" D.C. SUPER. CT. NEG. R. 14(b).

In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 471.
Id. at 472.
630 A.2d 202 (D.C. 1993).
In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 472 (quoting Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 210 (D.C.

78 Id.
79 Id. (referencing Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 210 (D.C. 1993)) (internal quotation
omitted).
80 Id.; D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-2301(9)(A)(v) (Supp. 2005) ("The term neglected child means a
child.., who is in imminent danger of being abused and whose sibling has been abused."). The statute
permits a finding of neglect if any child residing in the household - not only biological siblings - has
been neglected, and the child in question is in imminent danger. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-2301(9)(A)(v)
(Supp. 2005).
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The Court of Appeals observed that "a finding that a child is in imminent
danger of being abused because another child in the home has been abused 'can81
not be automatic."'
A determination that a child is neglected under this section of the statute requires a two-part finding. 82 First, another child or a sibling of the child who is in
"imminent danger" must have been abused.83 Second, there must be a separate,
"individualized" finding that the child is in "imminent danger;" "a finding of imminent danger
does not automatically follow from the fact that a sibling has been
84
abused."
With respect to both K.B. and Kye. B., the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment that the abuse of Kya. B. was sufficient to satisfy the first part of
the two-part test.85 With respect to the second prong of the "imminent danger"
test, the Court of Appeals reviewed the record and unearthed evidentiary support for the trial court's finding that K.B. was in imminent danger.86 "[Appellant]
admitted having beaten K.B. with a belt when he misbehaved and did not offer
any reason for such a punishment. '87 The Court of Appeals found, however, that
there was no such evidence in the trial record with respect to Kye. B., however,
88
and reversed the judgment of neglect as to Kye. B.
Somewhat ambiguously, after reversing the judgment as to Kye. B., the Court
of Appeals also remanded Kye. B.'s case to the trial judge with instructions to
"make a new ruling as to Kye. B. based on the facts and law as they exist at the
time of the remand proceedings." 89 Although it is unclear that any option other
than dismissal of the neglect case relating to Kye. B. would be available to a trial
court whose authority over a child is premised on the child having been adjudicated "neglected," the Court of Appeals expressed its confidence that the trial
court would use its "discretion and creativity" in shepherding the proceedings on
remand. 90
81
82
83

In re Kya. B., at 472 (quoting In re Te.L., 844 A.2d 333, 342 (D.C. 2004)).
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(A)(v) (Supp. 2005).
Id.

84 Id.
85 In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 472-73.
86 Id. at 473.
87 Id. With respect to K.B., the Court of Appeals appears to have engaged in a fact-finding
exercise often left to the trial court on remand. See, e.g., In re T.L., 859 A.2d 1087, 1093 (D.C. 2004)
("Although the reasons stated by the [trial] judge in her order.., standing alone, are insufficient, in
our view, to sustain a 'no visitation order' order.., we think it appropriate to remand the case to the
trial judge for findings of fact and conclusions of law ....
); see also In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857
n.42 (D.C. 1995) ("[W]e shall not be finding facts; that is a trial court function ... .
88 In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d at 473.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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In In re T. T.C.,91 the Court of Appeals addressed the responsibility of incarcerated parents to their children. The Court held that children were neglected
when their father became incarcerated and did not make arrangements for
the
92
children to be in the care of a person legally authorized to care for them.
Three children had been living with their father and his girlfriend, N.H., for
five years, until the father was incarcerated.9 3 The children remained living with
N.H. The children's mother, who had been addicted to crack cocaine for fifteen
years, apparently emerged from a period of absence from the children's daily
lives, and insisted on taking the children from N.H. and from their home.9"
Within days, the children were taken in by a neighbor, having been locked out of
their apartment in the rain. The apartment later was found to contain crack cocaine drug paraphernalia "within easy reach of the children."'95 N.H. retrieved
the children and contacted the child welfare agency, which pursued neglect
proceedings.
The children were found to have been neglected by the father pursuant to
D.C. Code section 16-2301(9)(C). A child is neglected under this subsection if a
"parent ... is unable to discharge his . . . responsibilities to and for the child
because of incarceration, hospitalization, or other physical or mental
96
incapacity. ,
The Court first held that incarceration, by itself, does not constitute an inability to discharge parental responsibilities. The Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument "that an incarcerated individual ipso facto cannot adequately
discharge responsibilities for a child.",97 "[W]e cannot accept the government's
argument to the trial court that incarceration per se constitutes an inability to
discharge parental responsibilities. ' '98 The Court found, however, that children
can be found to have been neglected by an incarcerated person, so long as the
proper "nexus" is proven between the parent's incarceration and the children's
condition. The Court noted that prior cases expressly require proof under the
same subsection of the statute of a causal relationship between "a parent's physical or mental incapacity and an inability to provide proper parental care." 99 The
Court concluded that it found "no reason ...

to treat a parent's incarceration

differently from the physical or mental incapacity of as parent and not require a
91 855 A.2d 1117 (D.C. 2004).
92 Id.at 1121.
93 Id.at 1118.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(C) (2001). This section has been recodified at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2301(9)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2004).
97 In re T.T.C., 855 A.2d at 1119.
98 Id.at 1120.
99 Id. at 1119-20 (quoting In re E.H., 718 A.2d 162, 169 (D.C. 1998) and In re B.L., 824 A.2d
954, 956 (D.C. 2003).
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'nexus' between the parent's condition and inability to discharge responsibilities
for the child to support an adjudication of neglect." 100
The Court thus upheld the finding of neglect as to these children because the
condition in which they were found was directly attributable, in the Court's opinion, to the incarcerated father's failure to provide the girlfriend with legal authorization to take care of the children, including legal authority such as a child
custody order, that would have permitted the girlfriend to withhold the children
from their mother. "[W]hen events ... unfold[ed] that put the children at risk,
i.e., the mother's arrival on the scene to claim custody, appellant was indisputably
'unable to discharge his responsibilities' because he was incarcerated and no
other individual was legally authorized to act on his behalf in assuming care of
the children and challenging the mother's fitness to care for the children."' 01
V.

ADOPTION

In In re J.L.,' °2 the Court upheld the trial court's waiver of a mother's consent
to the adoption of her two children. 10 3 The mother contended that the trial court
erred by ascertaining the children's wishes regarding the adoption from the testimony of social workers and the mother, rather than from the children themselves.' 0 4 This claim failed in part because the mother did not call the children as
witnesses at trial. 10 5 In addition, the Court reaffirmed that, although it may be
preferable for the court to hear from the child herself, where practicable in light
of a child's age and competence, 0 6 the statute does not say that the judge must
derive the child's wishes "even partly from questioning of the child herself
,,107

The Court also addressed the role of the trial judge in developing the factual
record of an adoption trial.'0 8 The Court recognized that it has previously held
that the trial court's parens patriae responsibility imposes on the trial judge an
obligation to "obtain all of the information needed to effect a judicious disposition, ' ' 09 though not to "investigate the case on the judge's own initiative."' 10 In
In re J.L., the Court of Appeals held that in light of the social workers' testimony,
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1121.
102 884 A.2d 1072 (D.C. 2005).
103 Id. at 1080.
104 Id. at 1077; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353(b)(4) (2001).
105 In re J.L., 884 A.2d at 1079.
106 Id. at 1080 (citing In re I.B., 631 A.2d 1225, 1232 (D.C. 1993)).
107 Id. at 1079 (citing In re T.W., 623 A.2d 116, 117 (D.C. 1993)).
108 Id. at 1077.
109 Id. at 1079 (quoting In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 476 (D.C. 1996)) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
110 Id. (quoting In re A.R., 679 A.2d at 475) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
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which provided substantial credible evidence as to the children's wishes, and the
mother's failure to call the children themselves
as witnesses, the trial judge was
11
not required to call the children as witnesses. '
13
In In re F.W.,112 the Court of Appeals upheld the adoption of two siblings.'
The Court deferred to the trial court's factual findings that the testimony of three
social workers and F.W. that the adoption would be in the children's best interest
was credible, and that the testimony
of a fourth, "less-experienced" social worker
11 4
not.
was
parents
birth
the
and
The Court also found that the trial court gave appropriate consideration to
factors of "race, culture, and gender." 1 5 Consistent with prior opinions, the
Court noted that although race may be considered as a factor in evaluating a
petition for adoption, it is a factor that "pales into insignificance" when compared
to "the health needs of the child." ' 1 6 The Court noted that evidence supported
the trial court's findings that the adoption petitioners, "who are described as Caucasian," are "sensitive to issues of cultural and racial heritage and [had made]
efforts to promote the children's racial identities and awareness of their heritage." ' 17 The Court also found that the presence of other African-American children already in the home supported the trial court's findings that the difference
in race between the petitioners and children did not make the adoption contrary
to the children's best interests." 8 The Court discounted concerns about the absence of a male role model in the home by pointing to the presence of an older
male child in the home." 9 Finally, the Court noted that "the fact that petitioners
are a same-sex-female couple cannot, in itself, be presumed contrary to [the
1 20
child's] interest."

111 Id. at 1080.
112 870 A.2d 82 (D.C. 2005).
113 Id. at 88.
114 Id. at 85; see also id. at 88 (Ruiz, J., dissenting) (stating that trial court's opinion contains
insufficient factual findings to support a determination that clear and convincing evidence supported
the adoption of one of the children).
115 Id. at 86.
116 Id. (quoting In re P.S., 797 A.2d 1219 (D.C. 2001)).
117 Id. at 87.
118 Id. at 86-87.
119 Id. at 87.
120 Id. The use of the qualifying phrase "in itself' suggests that the Court has not foreclosed the
possibility that a same-sex relationship may be considered harmful to potential adoptees, if not dispositively so.
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THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS LIMITS BIRTH PARENTS'
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN ADOPTION CASES

Judicial proceedings involving children in the District of Columbia have long
incorporated procedures that diverge from traditional components of an adversarial system. This section briefly describes two recent cases that have embedded

that trend even more firmly in the Court's family law jurisprudence. By trimming,
modifying or eliminating conventional aspects of the adversarial system, the
Court has lengthened the odds for parents whose children are ensnared in the
foster care system and are the subject of adoption proceedings.
Mindful of the court's interest in cases involving children to "serve the best
interests of the child," 12 1 the Court of Appeals has long countenanced, and in
some instances designed, judicial proceedings reflecting procedural features noticeably different than traditional litigation. 122 For example, in a 1992 case in
which the government sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother, the
Court of Appeals scolded the trial judge for scrupulously applying the rules of
evidence. 123 In 2000, the Court expressed disappointment with a trial judge who
denied a neglect petition following trial because the government had failed to

adduce evidence sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving neglect. The Court
expressed its preference for the trial court to take active steps to "exercise [its]
...powers to fill the evidentiary void in this case.'

1 24

The Court also has ex-

121 In re J.A., 601 A.2d 69, 76 (D.C. 1991); see also In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 475-76 (D.C. 1996)
("[A] child custody case is not a run-of-the-mill dispute in which only the parties' interests are implicated. Upon [the judge's] wisdom, insight and fairness [in cases such as this] rest[s] the future happiness of [her] wards.") (citation and internal quotation omitted).
122 See, e.g., In re A.R., 679 A.2d at 476 ("[I1n child custody cases, limited modifications of the
traditional requirements of the adversary system must be made, if necessary.") (citation and internal
quotation omitted).
123 In the Matter of L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 353 n.6 (D.C. 1992). As the Court of Appeals noted:
Although we appreciate the judge's efforts to maintain her impartiality and to operate with a
defined and finite record, we think it important to emphasize once again that where, as here,
the future of a child is at stake, the judge should do her (or his) best to obtain all of the
information needed to effect a judicious disposition. The rigorous application of evidentiary
rules is out of place in a case of this kind ....
Id. (citations omitted).
124 In re M.D., 758 A.2d 27, 34 (D.C. 2000). As the Court of Appeals noted:
[Tihe trial court in a neglect proceeding ought not to be passive in the face of what it recognizes is a deficient presentation of evidence . . .. When neither the District nor the other
parties to the factfinding hearing undertook to present. . . evidence [of the quality of medical
care obtained for the child by the mother], the trial court had the authority in its capacity as
parens patriae to stay the proceeding and direct the District (or other appropriate party) to
augment the record with medical testimony and [the child's] medical records.
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to proceedings in the trial court on repressed atypical flexibility with respect
12 5
determinations.
own
its
from
mand
The legislature - both federal and local - has gotten into the act, too. Since the
enactment of the District of Columbia Adoption and Safe Families Act 126 and
the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001,127 trials for the adoption of
abused and neglected children are presided over by the same judicial officer
charged with presiding over the child's abuse and neglect proceeding. In the
course of the abuse and neglect matter, the judge enters a "permanency planning
order" reflecting the court's judgment as to whether the child ultimately should
be returned to the parent, adopted, or placed in another legal status.128 Even
with respect to children whom the court has decided in the permanency planning
order will be best served by adoption, the very same judge presides over the
actual trial of the adoption petition. Thus, a parent reasonably could fear that the
outcome of the adoption proceeding is a foregone conclusion. The Court of Apby holding the entry of a "permanency planning
peals validated this approach
1 29
order" unappealable.
In the main, the Court of Appeals' approach reflects a great degree of deference to the trial court and a willingness to endorse unorthodox fact-finding
processes. The appeals court's rulings leave biological parents nearly defenseless
to effectively contest adoptions.
Recent decisions by the Court demonstrate a furtherance of the Court's trend
toward deference to the trial court with respect to adoption procedures crafted by
the trial court. In both the 2001 decision of In re A.W. K., 13 0 and the 2004 decision
of In re H.B., 13 ' the Court affirmed the deprivation to a parent of traditional
guideposts of procedural fairness and predictability. Taken together, these decisions represent further departures from traditional notions of procedural conventionality, and drastically inhibit birth parents' ability to successfully contest
proceedings for the adoption of their children. In A.W.K., the first hint that the
Court seeks to open wide the courthouse doors to potential adoptive parents is in
125 In re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382, 1391 n.14 (D.C.1989) (Schwelb, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Judge Schwelb wrote:
Because a child's safety may be at stake, I would not preclude the government on remand
from proving the truth of Children's Hospital's allegations in spite of the fact that it could
have done so at the original hearing, for I am not prepared to insist on rigorous adherence to
principles of waiver or estoppel if that might augment the risk to S.K.'s life or well-being.
Id.
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-72, 675 (2007); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1301-1501 and 16-2301-2399 (2006).
127 Pub. L. No. 107-114, 115 Stat. 2101 (2002); D.C. CODE AN. § 11-1101-1106 (2006).
128 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2323(c) ("The purpose of the permanency hearing shall include...
determining the permanency plan for the child, including whether, and if so when, the child will be:
(1) Returned to the parent; (2) Placed for adoption .... ").
129 In re K.M.T., 795 A.2d 688, 690-91 (D.C. 2002).
130 778 A.2d 314 (D.C. 2001).
131 855 A.2d 1091 (D.C. 2004).
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the Court's rejection of appellants' challenge to the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court's authority to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the case under consideration.1 32 In
Customer's Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia,3 3 the Court held that parties
can neither waive subject matter jurisdiction nor confer it on the court by con34
sent, and the absence of such jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
Subject matter jurisdiction is so essential to the court's authority to render a
decision that the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
during the life cycle of a case, including on appeal, and must even be raised sua
sponte by the Court.1 35 In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
may not rule and the case must be dismissed. 3 6

Notwithstanding the hoary precepts regarding subject matter jurisdiction set
forth above, however, in In re A.W.K., the Court upheld the trial court's subject

matter jurisdiction even though applicable jurisdiction statutes were not, by their
plain language, satisfied under the circumstances of the case. 137 The Court recognized that the trial court had granted an adoption petition without satisfying any
of the three available jurisdictional bases for exercising authority over the
case.1 38 Finding the absence of jurisdiction a mere "technical defect," however,
the Court of Appeals nonetheless declined to overturn the adoption decree, find132 In re A.H., 590 A.2d 123, 128 (D.C. 1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 11 (1982)). "A court by its own words cannot create or extinguish its own subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the source of jurisdiction is the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is
created." Id. at 129 (citing Demar v. Open Space & Conservation Comm'n, 559 A.2d 1103, 1107-08
(1989)) (internal quotation omitted).
133 562 A.2d 651 (D.C. 1989).
134 Id. at 654.
135 United States v. Stephenson, 891 A.2d 1076, 1078 n.1 (D.C. 2006) (citing In re D.M., 771
A.2d. 360, 364 (D.C. 1991) ("Where a substantial question exists as to this court's subject matter
jurisdiction, it is our obligation to raise it, sua sponte, even though[, as here,] no party has asked us to
consider it.") (citation omitted)).
136 Id. ("Without jurisdiction, the Court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.") (quoting In re D.M., 771 A.2d. at 364) (internal
quotation omitted).
137 In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d 314 (D.C. 2001).
138 Id. at 322. Pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-301(b)(1)-(3), the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia has jurisdiction to hear an adoption petition in any of the following circumstances:
(1) petitioner is a legal resident of the District of Columbia;
(2) petitioner has actually resided in the District of Columbia for at least one year next preceding the filing of the petition; or
(3) the child to be adopted is in the legal care, custody, or control of the Mayor or a childplacing agency licensed under the laws of the District.
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ing that 39the trial court had "constructive jurisdiction" to adjudicate the
petition.1
The Court of Appeals then affirmed several aspects of the trial court's deviation from a traditional approach to procedural fairness. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is
required to shoulder the burden of proving all elements of a litigated claim.140 To
promote even-handedness, minimize surprise and promote judicial efficiency,
parties ordinarily are entitled to seek discovery extremely broadly in civil matters
as to all matters relevant in the litigation, even if the material sought will not
itself be admissible at trial. 141 Parties typically are entitled to challenge or controvert by cross-examination or submission of testimony or documentary evidence
any evidence proffered by another party.
In In re A.WK., the Court of Appeals upheld trial court findings that rendered
the fitness of adoption petitioners irrelevant to an adoption proceeding and immune to challenge or meaningful inquiry. Specifically, the Court ratified the trial
court's "bifurcation" of adoption proceedings, which insulates adoption petitioners from meaningful scrutiny in the adversarial process. 14 2 In upholding the trial
court's view of an adoption proceeding as a two-stage process in which only the
parents' fitness, and not that of the adoption petitioners, is subjected to the rigors
of the adversarial litigation process, the Court of Appeals also affirmed drastic
limitations on discovery obtainable by parents seeking to challenge adoption
143
petitions.
Petitioners in In re A. W.K. sought approval of their adoption petition pursuant
to D.C. Code section 16-304(e), which provides that the trial court may grant an
adoption petition when it finds "after a hearing that the [parents'] ...consents [to
the petition] are being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child.' 144 The
parents of the child, contesting the petition, sought discovery regarding the financial and personal histories of the petitioners. This was done in an attempt to
139 In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d at 323. There appears to be no other opinion published by the Court
of Appeals in which the concept of "constructive jurisdiction" is applied.
140 See, e.g., In re M.D., 758 A.2d 27, 32 (D.C. 2000) (holding that even if the government
proved that the child's eczema did not respond to the mother's care, it nevertheless failed to establish
that the mother did not provide proper care; therefore, the government failed to prove its medical
neglect claim).
141 Under the Superior Court Rules of Adoption
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
issues involved in the pending action, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
D.C. SUPER. CT. ADOPTION R. 26(b)(1).

142
143
144

In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d at 326.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 324; D.C. CooE ANN. § 16-304(e) (2001).
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prove that it would not be in the child's best interest that the petition be granted
or that a 1 parent-child
relationship be created between the child and the
45
petitioners.
The trial court denied the discovery and stated during a status hearing that
"the only issue to be decided [at trial] would be the fitness of the birth parents. ' 146 The hearing "[will] not get into [sic] the petitioners., 147 The trial court
issued an "omnibus pretrial order," which informed the parties that any issue
involving the petitioners' fitness would be decided subsequent to the trial
"[based] on the paper record in the court file.' 14 8 Accordingly, the trial "fothe birth parents themselves in considercus[ed] almost entirely on the fitness of
' 49
ing whether to waive their consents.'
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was justified "in considering
whether the birth parents were withholding consent contrary to the best interests
without a full consideration of the particular adoption which was being
of A.W.K.
150
sought.
This practice reflects an unusually narrow view of the issues relevant to an
adoption proceeding. The holding precludes full and fair litigation of the adoption petitioners' fitness and relationship with the child, an issue not only relevant,
but fundamental to the court's determination of the adoption petition. In addition, this holding ratifies the trial court's practice of making factual findings and
conclusions of law based on an in camera review of information contained in
investigation reports prepared by social workers. The Court's ruling on these issues conflicts with established statutory and case law in the District of Columbia
and elsewhere.
The fitness of the adoption petitioners and their relationship to the child traditionally are central to the court's adjudication of the petition. The consequence of
adoption is termination of the parent-child relationship between the biological
145 In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d at 324; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (2001) ("A final decree
of adoption establishes the relationship of natural parent and natural child between adopter and
adoptee for all purposes .... ).
146 In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d at 323-24.
147 Id. at 324.
148 Id. at 323. Ordinarily, the "paper record in the court file" consists primarily of an investigative report written by the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) or a private social work agency
under contract with CFSA. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-307(a)-(c) (2001). The report is required to
contain, inter alia, the results of an investigation into "the truth of the allegations of the petition"
(D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-307(b)(1)(A) (2001)), "the home of the petitioner, to determine whether the
home is a suitable one for the prospective adoptee" (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-307(b)(1)(C) (2001)),
"any other circumstances and conditions that may have a bearing on the proposed adoption and of
which the court should have knowledge" (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-307(b)(1)(D) (2001)), as well as a
recommendation to the court as to whether the petition for adoption should be granted. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-307(b)(3) (2001).
149 In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d at 326-27.
150 Id. at 326.
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parents and the child, and creation of a legally cognizable parent-child relationship between the adoption petitioners and the child.' 51 Thus, the fitness of the
adoption petitioners and their relationship to the child is at the core of the trial
court's determination. Indeed, the D.C. Code emphasizes the importance of the
petitioners' fitness and relationship with the child by setting forth the relationship
between the child and all involved as one of five factors that152must be considered
in adjudicating a motion for termination of parental rights.
Similarly, the Court's ratification of the trial court basing findings of fact and
conclusions of law on an in camera review of a "paper record" minimizes petitioners' burden of proof. This approach also limits parents' ability to challenge

evidence on which the trial court relies in a manner that is inconsistent with fundamental elements of procedural fairness and long-existing case law in the District of Columbia.
For example, in Mazur v. Lazarus,'5 3 the Court of Appeals found it was reversible error for the trial court to deny the maternal grandmother of two minor
boys an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who prepared social agency
reports, which the trial court then relied on to award custody of the boys to their
father.' 5 4 The Court explained that the use of the reports by the trial court with151 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (2001).
152 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353(b)(3) (2001) (The judge shall consider "the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent, siblings, relative, and/or caretakers,
including the foster parent .... ); see also In re T.M., 665 A.2d 950, 955 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam) (In
a termination of parental rights proceeding the court should consider "the quality of the interaction
and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent, siblings, relative and/or caretakers, including
foster parent .... ") (emphasis in original).
Ironically, a Court of Appeals opinion in 2005 appears to reflect the Court's own recognition that
the fitness of adoption petitioners is a subject integral to adjudication of an adoption trial proceeding.
Although the Court denied appellant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in waiving the
mother's consent without hearing testimony from the petitioners, the Court did so on the apparent
basis that the trial court had received during the trial substantial information about the petitioners. In
re J.L, 884 A.2d 1072 (D.C. 2005). The Court noted that "although receiving testimony from the
petitioners might well be the better practice, we do not think it is compelled in a case where three
social workers provided comprehensive information based on their personal observation of the petitioners." Id. at 1079 n.5 (emphasis added).
The Court itself thus underscored the significance of information about the petitioners in the
adjudication of an adoption proceeding. Nonetheless, although appearing to implicitly accept that
information supportive of petitioners' fitness is relevant to an adoption proceeding, the Court in J.L.
made no statement regarding whether parents may discover information, or offer evidence, that
would tend to undercut petitioners' claims of fitness. Further, in J.L., the Court failed to explicitly
indicate a retrenchment from its aggressive posture in A.WK. and provides no guidance to parents as
to the means by which information regarding petitioners may be obtained through discovery. It is
therefore unclear whether J.L. genuinely reflects a softening of A.W.K.'s suggestion that evidence
about the petitioners is irrelevant to an adoption decision and the drastic discovery limitations imposed by the A.W.K. Court.
153 196 A.2d 477 (D.C. 1964).
154 Id. at 479.
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out affording the parties an opportunity to cross-examine the reporters or even to
read the reports amounted to a private investigation by the trial judge in assembling and receiving evidence out of the sight and hearing of the parties, who were
55
thus deprived of the right to test, explain, or rebut such evidence.'
In Ziegler v. Ziegler' 56 the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
In adjudicating a motion to modify an order of child support, the trial court, sua
sponte, raised the issue of custody, and suspended the child support modification
hearing. The trial court also requested social, psychiatric, and other evaluations
of the parents and then used the evaluation reports to find the parents unfit and
to place children with Director of Social Services - all without allowing the parents to cross-examine the preparers of the reports. 15 7 The Court of Appeals held
'158
that such a "plain violation of due process requirements requires reversal.'
Similarly, the Court held in Scott v. Scott,t 59 that the trial court erred in a divorce
and custody action, where the trial court awarded custody to the mother without
notice to the parties and solely on the basis of a report never made part of the
record, and where the father therefore had no chance to cross-examine the
60
preparer of the report.1
In 2004, the Court again deferred to distinctive practices implemented by the
trial court in upholding an adoption decree awarded nearly six months after the
petitioner rested its case in In re H.B.' 6 ' The Court affirmed the issuance of an
adoption decree despite the trial judge's acknowledgement, at the close of trial,
that he "might" not have enough evidence to grant the petition. 16 2 The Court
held that a provision of the D.C. Code eliminates any temporal restriction on the
trial court's adjudication of adoption petitions. This holding permits the trial
court to grant an adoption decree at any juncture at which the trial court believes
the quantum of evidence is sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard. The court
held that such evidence satisfies the statutory standard even if the evidence is not
adduced during trial and even if it is obtained by requiring the objecting parent 155 Id.; see also State ex rel. Fisher v. Devins, 200 N.W.2d 28, 32 (Minn. 1972) (reversing custody award because trial court considered report prepared by a probation officer but did not allow
opposing party to cross-examine the officer).
156 304 A.2d 13 (D.C. 1973) (per curiam).
157 Id. at 14.
158 Id.
159 415 A.2d 812 (D.C. 1980) (per curiam).
160 Id. at 813; see also Tyree v. Evans, 728 A.2d 101, 104-05 (D.C. 1999) (holding that in a civil
protection order proceeding, although the trial court may place reasonable limits on cross-examination, the trial court erred in precluding altogether the cross-examination of a pro se petitioner because
"[in almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.") (citations omitted).
161 855 A.2d 1091 (D.C. 2004).
162 In re H.B., 855 A.2d at 1094, 1100.
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the non-moving party - to produce evidence that ultimately is used to her
detriment.
Traditionally, the plaintiff or petitioner, as the moving party, is responsible for
shouldering the burden of proof in the proceeding by demonstrating that the applicable evidentiary standard is satisfied with respect to each element of the cause
of action. 163 The moving party must offer sufficient evidence on each cause of
action, after which the matter ordinarily is submitted to the finder of fact for
decision. Thus, failure by the moving party to offer sufficient evidence to permit a
favorable verdict constitutes a failure of proof to entitlement to relief, and should
result in denial of the claim or dismissal of the action.164
At the end of the first day of the adoption trial, the trial court described the
case as a "close" one, and stated that the court was considering staying the adoption petition for three to six months. 165 The court indicated that it was considering recommending that the judge supervising the child's abuse and neglect case
temporarily place the child in the mother's custody. 166 On the second day of trial,
the trial court observed that it "might lack the clear and convincing evidence
necessary" to grant the adoption petition over the parent's objection, and "acknowledged that the case posed a number of appellate problems.' 167 Among the
facts described by the trial court as "problems" were the court's belief, based on
the evidence presented at trial, that the mother "had made 'significant progress"'
in recovering from a substance abuse problem and by obtaining regular employment.1 6 8 The trial court also described as an "appellate problem" the termina169
tion, without an evidentiary hearing, of the mother's rights to visit the child.
Finally, the trial court noted that the social worker, apparently intended by the
adoption petitioners to serve as a witness on their behalf, had, "in some instances,
testified very favorably toward the mother.' 170 The social worker also had lost a
"substantial number" of records relating to the case.' 7 1
Notwithstanding these observations, the trial court was "not convinced that
R.W. could function as a mother.' 172 After hearing from two final witnesses,
163 "The general rule is that a party asserting or pleading an issue has the burden of proof - i.e.,
burden of persuasion - and its constituent burden of production - i.e., the initial burden of going
forward with evidence - as to each material element of such issue in order to prevail." Nader v.
Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 48 (D.C. 1979). See Manuel v. McCorkle, 749 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Ark. Ct. App.
1988); In re Adoption of Ford, 849 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
164 Nader, 408 A.2d at 48.
165 In re H.B., 855 A.2d at 1094.
166 Id.
167 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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"both of whom testified favorably to R.W. [the mother]," the trial court issued an
order staying the adoption case. 17 3 The trial court stated that it was issuing
the
174
stay "to give R.W. a chance to demonstrate her fitness as a mother.
Five and one-half months later, R.W. appeared at a status hearing before the
adoption trial judge.' 75 She was "escorted into the courtroom by Deputy U.S.
Marshals with her right arm in a sling and appearing very distressed and upset.",176 R.W. testified that she had been arrested in connection with arguments
with her fianc. 177 The social worker testified that he had made twenty attempts
to contact R.W., and that he had been unable to do so. 178 The social worker
stated that he had visited the homes of R.W.'s fianc6 and R.W.'s daughter, and
that neither person was able to locate R.W. In addition, R.W. had lost her job
and had failed to appear for weekly drug testing during the previous four
months. 179 Finally, R.W. testified "rapidly and in a high-strung manner.' 180 The
trial court found that R.W. no longer was able to care for herself and thus was
unable to care for the child. 18 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
and granted the adoption petition, finding
that terminating the mother's parental
82
rights was in the child's best interests.'
In short, the trial court declined to grant the adoption petition at the close of
trial, held the record open to "give [the mother] a chance to demonstrate" her
fitness - rather than allowing petitioners, the moving party, to generate evidence
of the mother's unfitness - and granted the petition based on the mother's actions that occurred, and evidence of those actions that came into existence, only
after the close of evidence at trial.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's adjudicatory approach.' 8 3 The
Court notes that "after considering the petition, the consents, and such evidence
as the parties and any other properly interested person may present,"' 8 4 the
court may enter a final or interlocutory decree of adoption "when it is satisfied...
' 18
that the adoption will be for the best interests of the prospective adoptee. 5
Observing that the trial court "lacked evidence of R.W.'s abilities to function as a
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
tions and

Id.
Id.
In re H.B., 855 A.2d at 1095.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id. at 1096 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-309(b) (2001)) (internal quotation omitted).
Id. (quoting In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. 1985)) (emphasis added) (internal citaquotation omitted).
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mother," the Court of Appeals infers from the word "when" in D.C. Code section
16-309 a temporal component, and holds that the adoption statute "gives the trial
court as 1 86
much time as necessary to address the merits of the adoption
petition.
It seems unlikely that the legislature intended adoption proceedings to be
open-ended and perpetually subject to the introduction of new evidence. The
statute more justifiably should be understood to suggest a conditional meaning of
the word "when". Thus, "when" should be understood to mean "only if." If understood in this manner, the statute would comport with the larger structure of
adoption and other legal proceedings, as well as traditional notions of due process and fairness. In other words, rather than allowing the trial court to await the
creation of evidence that would support the granting of an adoption petition, the
statute more reasonably should be understood to mean that the trial court may
grant an adoption petition if, and only if, the record adduced at trial justifies a
finding that to do so would be in the child's best interests.
In addition, the Court's interpretation of the statute permits the trial court to
shift to the mother the burden of proof as to a central element of petitioners'
claim, namely the fitness as a parent of the mother herself. 187 The evidence of the
mother's unfitness that justified granting the adoption petition came into existence only after the conclusion of the scheduled trial, and only by the mother's
actions. 188
The Court's hands-off approach, exemplified by the analysis and outcomes of
In re A. W.K. 18 9 and In re H.B., 190 appears to undermine parents' ability to effectively contest adoption petitions. Taken together, the opinions permit subject
matter jurisdiction to be asserted without satisfaction of the statutory bases of
subject matter jurisdiction and preclude parents from propounding discovery relating to the adoption petitioners' relationship to the child and fitness to parent.
The opinions also relegate consideration of the petitioners' fitness to in camera
review of an unchallengeable report prepared by social workers, eliminate the
186
187

Id.; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-309 (2001).
In re H.B., 855 A.2d at 1094.

188 It is important to recognize that the mother did not object to the trial court holding the
matter in abeyance. Thus, the Court of Appeals might well have reached the same outcome by apply-

ing the heightened standard of review applicable in situations in which an issue is not preserved for
appeal. See Thorne v. United States, 582 A.2d 964, 965 (D.C.1990) ("A party who neglects to seek a
ruling on his motion fails to preserve the issue for appeal."); see also Deramus v. Donovan, Leisure,

Newton & Irvine, 905 A.2d 164, 170 (D.C. 2006) ("[T]hose errors raised for the first time on appeal
are not grounds for reversal unless it is apparent from the face of the record that a miscarriage of
justice has occurred." (quoting Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Square, Inc., 414 A.2d
834, 839-40 (D.C.1980)) (internal quotation omitted). The Court's analysis does not appear to be
premised on appellant's failure to preserve the issue, however, and appears to constitute a wholesale
endorsement of the practice.
189 778 A.2d 314 (D.C. 2001).
190 855 A.2d 1091 (D.C. 2004).
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predictability and finality of adoption trials, and permit parents' to be required to
prove their own fitness rather than being proven unfit by evidence adduced by
others.

